This paper explores the role of incentives in the English National Health Service. Until financial year 2009/2010, elective procedures that were cancelled after admission received a fixed reimbursement associated with a specific healthcare resource group code. We investigate whether this induced trusts to admit and then cancel, rather than cancel before admission and/or to cancel low fee over high fee work. As the tariff was ended in April 2010, we conduct an interrupted time series analysis to examine if their behaviour was affected after the tariff removal. The results indicate a small, yet statistically significant, decline in the probability of a last minute cancellation in the post-tariff period, especially for certain types of patients and diagnoses.
INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, approximately the 3.5% of elective procedures were cancelled after patients were admitted to National Health Service (NHS) hospitals each year. Such cases are generally termed as 'last minute cancellations', and they lead to waste of time and resources (Lacqua and Evans, 1994) . Moreover, they may have adverse impacts, emotional or economical, upon both patients and their families (Ivarsson et al., 2002; Mangram, 1992; Tait et al., 1997) . There is an emerging strand of literature attempting to model the frequency of cancelled elective procedures. Two recent papers by Cookson et al. (2012) and McIntosh et al. (2012) have modelled the incidence of last-minute cancellations of elective procedures in the English NHS using patientlevel information extracted from the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database. Both papers reported that age, gender, day of admission, socio-economic status and hospital characteristics were significant predictors of the probability of a procedure being cancelled after admission. An earlier observational study by Sanjay et al. (2007) investigated the incidence of all cancelled operations and reported that inconvenient appointments and list overruns were the most common reasons for cancelling.patient's admission. Hence, if the tariff provided hospitals with an incentive to cancel an elective procedure at the last minute following a selective behaviour, its removal may have had a direct impact on their behaviour by decreasing the probability for a patient's procedure to be cancelled after his admission for non-clinical reasons. To explore this hypothesis, we make use of detailed patient-level data on elective procedures in all the English NHS trusts from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011. A before-and-after design is applied to evaluate whether the trend of last-minute cancellations has declined in the period after the tariff removal. Our results indicate a small, yet statistically significant decline in the probability of a last-minute cancellation since the second quarter of 2010, especially for certain types of patients and diagnoses. Having controlled for patient and provider-level heterogeneity, we interpret our findings as evidence favouring that removing a problematic tariff was effective.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the estimation strategy. Section 3 outlines the data used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses the obtained results, and Section 5 concludes.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our analysis focuses on evaluating the impact, if any, of the tariff removal regarding the fixed reimbursement associated with last-minute cancellations in the English NHS. Whether NHS providers had an incentive to admit a patient and then cancel the procedure or to cancel low fee work over high fee work, we seek to investigate if this incentive has weakened after the exclusion of that HRG code from the scope of the mandatory tariff. The tariff reform was introduced in the beginning of financial year 2010/2011 (April), and it was applied to all NHS providers as it was part of the PbR system. Therefore, there are no distinct treated and control providers so that a difference-in-differences or a propensity score matching approach can be used. However, given that our data are sufficiently distributed before and after the intervention, we can adopt another quasi-experimental research design based on a before-and-after approach.
2 Because there is no theoretical reason to expect a sharp change in the behaviour of providers right after the tariff removal, we estimate interrupted time series models, which allow for a more gradual adjustment of their behaviour over time. This method has a potentially high degree of internal validity and has been widely used in healthcare research (Bernal et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2011; Huesch et al., 2012; Linden, 2015) . 3 In the absence of treated and comparison groups, the standard interrupted time series model assumes the following functional form:
where y itj is an indicator for whether the procedure for the i-th patient admitted in the j -th NHS provider during month t was cancelled on the last minute (hence, the associated HRG code was WA14Z). Variable t is a running counter of months since January of 2009, which is the first month in our data, and Q t specifies the tariff removal introduced at the first month (April) of the 2010/2011 financial year. Therefore,ˇ1 is the trajectory of the cancellation probability before the tariff removal,ˇ2 measures the step change of the outcome after the tariff removal andˇ3 is the slope change in the post-tariff period. The latter is compared with the counterfactual, that is, the pre-intervention trend that is assumed to had remained unchanged throughout the period in the absence of the tariff reform. Given the functional form of the model considered here, this is the identification assumption of the analysis (Huesch et al., 2012) . Statistically significant p-values inˇ2 orˇ3 will indicate an immediate or a gradual treatment effect over time, respectively (Linden, 2015) . Chow tests for the existence of a structural break in the series at the beginning of financial year 2010/2011 are also performed (H 0 :ˇ2 Dˇ3 D 0).
The model also controls for patient-level and provider-level heterogeneity, although an advantage of the interrupted time series approach is that it is not affected from time-varying confounders, which evolve slowly over time (Bernal et al., 2016) . More specifically, there are controls for gender, age, ethnicity, waiting time between referral and admission, transfer to another provider, diagnosis chapter heading, socio-economic status of the area where the patient permanently lives into, discharge to the usual place of residence and controls about the day of the week the admission took place. At the provider level, the model controls for the hospital type, for example, university teaching hospital, specialist hospital and foundation trust. However, the observed hospital type remains unchanged during the period considered here, and these controls are omitted when we allow for provider-specific intercepts; ı is a set of provider-level fixed effects that capture all time-invariant provider heterogeneity. Also, Á denotes the month of admission and captures seasonal effects, and is the error term. We model the probability of a last-minute cancellation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), although we probe the robustness of the results using logistic and complementary log-log regressions given that lastminute cancellations are rare . 4 The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the provider level in order to allow for common error components for patients admitted to the same provider. We also conduct the analysis at the provider level taking into account the fractional nature of the response variable and controlling for provider fixed effects.
DATA
We use the HES database, which contains anonymous administrative patient data. The original sample consisted of 22 005 931 observations of NHS patients who underwent elective procedures from January 2009 to December 2011 in various NHS facilities. After removing all the observations with missing data on key variables used in the analysis, we were left with 18 659 096 observations. A brief inspection did not indicate any correlation between missing data and particular provider-level or patient-level characteristics. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether an elective procedure was cancelled after admission, that is, whether a WA14Z HRG code was attached. There is no way of knowing what procedure had been originally planned because all cancelled operations are coded as WA14Z.
The patient characteristics include gender, age, ethnicity, waiting time, transferring to another provider, diagnosis chapter heading, socio-economic status, the Charlson comorbidity index, discharge to the usual place of residence and indicators regarding the day and month of admission. The diagnosis chapter headings follow the 10th Revision of the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10). These diagnostic codes are used alongside with procedural codes (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) Classification of Interventions and Procedures, not available in our HES extract) to capture every detail of a clinical event and determine the HRG codes. The admitted patients contained in our data can be classified into 1574 three-digit alphanumeric diagnosis codes that can be aggregated to 20 chapters (see Table A1 for the full definition of the admissions examined here). 5 The socio-economic status of patients is based on the socioeconomic quintile of their residence area, and it is measured using the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation at the super output area (DCLG, 2007) . 6 Waiting time measures the time between the referral of a patient and his admission for the procedure. Because of its skewed distribution, it is expressed in logarithms. The modified Charlson comorbidity index captures potential need and complexity of each procedure (Bottle and Aylin, 2011) . The transfer indicator variable is included because hospitals may transfer a patient to another provider or admit a patient to a ward instead of cancelling the procedure . Individual time dummy variables indicate the day of week and the month of year the patient was admitted for a procedure. Provider characteristics include binary variables indicating the hospital type, that is, whether it was a secondary care provider, a foundation trust, a university or a specialist hospital. 7 Table I displays the descriptive statistics on some key variables used in the analysis regarding the total period as well as before and after the tariff removal. Approximately 3% of the planned procedures are being cancelled on the last minute, with a small statistically significant decrease being observed in the post-tariff period. Regarding the other variables, their differences in means between the two periods are statistically significant in most cases; however, a brief inspection revealed that they have evolved rather slowly over time so they are not expected to violate the underlying assumptions of the segmented regression analysis design adopted here (Bernal et al., 2016; Huesch et al., 2012) . This is important, especially for variables that could be considered as outcomes such as waiting time. However, given their small time variance over the period and because previous studies have used them as patient-level controls when modelling last-minute cancellations , they are not omitted from the explanatory vector, and their inclusion or not does not affect the results. Moreover, controlling for the composition of the admitted population as well as for time and provider fixed effects will mitigate any biases.
The evolution of the cancellation rate is shown in Figure 1 (a) and (b). Figure 1 (a) presents the average monthly cancelling rate over the total period. There seems to be a small decrease after the tariff removal; however, the time series plot is dominated by month effects. In order to remove them, we regressed the incidence of last-minute cancellation on month of admission indicators and plotted the mean residuals in Figure 1(b) , where the decrease, although small, is more apparent. This can also be seen in Figure 2 where the relative frequency distribution of the cancellation rate across providers before and after the tariff change is depicted.
8 Moreover, the observed decline of the cancellation probability is statistically significant. Table II reports the cancellation rate before and after the tariff change for all admissions and for a series of subsamples, namely, by provider type and diagnosis chapter heading. There is descriptive evidence for a statistically significant incidence of lastminute cancellations in the post-tariff period for patients admitted to foundation trusts and teaching hospitals as well as for certain ICD codes, for example, infectious diseases, neoplasms, diseases of the musculoskeletal system, nervous system diseases, diseases of the digestive system and skin-related diseases, while the cancellation rate appears increased for some others, for example, diseases of the eye and adnexa and diseases of the genitourinary system. Although small, the observed figures for last-minute cancellations are quite accurate because the HRG codes are tied to hospital reimbursement. Regarding some demographic characteristics, the cancellation probability has declined for women, those below 30 years old and those with a white ethnic background. Table III displays the results from modelling the incidence of a last-minute cancellation at the patient level. In panel A, we performed the estimation on the full sample of patients with non-missing values on key variables. The model is progressively saturated to control for a variable indicating the removal of the tariff at the beginning of financial year 2010/2011 (April 2010), period-specific time trends, patient and provider characteristics, time fixed effects and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the provider level. As seen in the first two columns, the average cancellation rate is slightly above 3%, and the probability of being cancelled seems to slightly decline after the tariff removal. Next, we condition the cancellation probability on a set of patient and providerspecific variables. Patient heterogeneity is captured using controls for gender (males are the base group), age (patients aged less than 9 years are the reference category), ethnic background (patients of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or any other Asian background are the base ethnic group classified as 'Indian'), waiting time between referral and admission, a binary indicator of whether the patient was transferred to another provider, a binary indicator of whether the patient was discharged to his usual place of residence (rather to the temporary In panel B, the estimation samples are as follows: length of stay<1 day (column 1), admitted to a secondary care provider (column 2), excluding those admitted in mental or community care providers (column 3), discharged home (column 4), length of stay<1 day & admitted to a secondary care provider (column 5) and all previous restrictions imposed simultaneously (column 6). a p < :001; b p < :05; c p < :01 (for groups of variables, they indicate the results of a joint significance test).
place of residence, a security institution, care home etc.), diagnosis chapter heading (certain infectious and parasitic diseases are the reference diagnosis category) and socio-economic status of the patient's permanent residence area using quintiles of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) at the super output area (the lowest quintile is the base one). Provider characteristics include indicators regarding the observed hospital type, that is, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital, mental health hospital, community care provider and secondary care provider, but these are time invariant and they are removed from the specifications that control for provider-specific intercepts. Controlling for observed patient and provider characteristics in columns 3 and 4 does not seem to affect the magnitude and the sign of the estimated coefficient of interest (ˇ3, the post-tariff linear time trend), but there is also evidence for a statistically significant negative step change and a positive secular trend as well. However, controlling for time fixed effects (month and day of admission) and time-invariant provider heterogeneity in columns 5 and 6 leads to the rejection of the hypothesis about the existence of a sharp change right after the tariff removal. Also, the coefficient of the secular trend is now very low and marginally significant at the 10% level. The results from the full model specification seem to favour the existence of a slope change in the cancellation probability. Moreover, a series of Chow tests performed in columns 2 6 also justify the existence of a structural break at the introduction of the 2010/2011 PbR system (H 0 :ˇ2 Dˇ3 D 0).
In panel B, we probe the robustness of the baseline results by re-estimating the full model specification on various alternative subsamples. In column 1, we restrict the sample to patients with length of stay less than a day because cases with greater length of stay are atypical and may confound the analysis (Cooper et al., 2009) . A similar point has been made by Cookson et al. (2012) who mentioned that any last-minute cancellations would normally occur shortly after admission. On the other hand, longer stays are more likely to result from complications or complexities not necessarily related to the elective procedure. The obtained results lead to the same conclusions regarding the existence of a slight but statistically significant slope change after the tariff removal. In column 2 of panel B, we restrict the sample to patients admitted to secondary care providers as this is common when performing secondary care analysis (primary care providers, mental health and community trusts do not often perform the same types of procedures). Similarly, in column 3 of panel B, we exclude patients admitted to mental health and community care providers, and in column 4, we include only those patients who were discharged to their usual place of residence. 10 In column 4, we combine the restrictions about length of stay shorter than a day and discharge to the usual place or residence, while in column 5, we impose all the aforementioned conditions simultaneously. Hence, the most restricted sample (column 6 of panel B) consists of patients with length of stay shorter than a day who were admitted to a secondary care provider (not to mental or community care providers) and who were discharged to their usual place of residence. The results are nearly identical to those reported in column 6 of panel A and indicate that the probability of being cancelled on the last minute declined by approximately 0.012% each month in the post-tariff period. Full results listing coefficients and t-statistics on the rest regressors of the models presented in column 6 of Table III are available in Table A2 .
Overall, the results indicate that providers seem to have responded to the tariff change, even if the estimated effect is small. The estimations on the full and the restricted samples suggest that the last-minute cancellation probability for elective procedures has been declining by 0.012% each month, on average, during the post-tariff period, or approximately 3000 less last-minute cancellations each month. In other words, removing a rather problematic tariff generated savings of about £14 million each month during the period examined here and prevented the adverse effects for a large number of patients. The same conclusions are drawn if we collapse our dataset and conduct the analysis at the provider level, given that we seek to test for any changes in the behaviour of providers in the post-reform period. In this case, given that the dependent variable is by construction bounded between 0 and 1, we estimate Equation (1) using a fractional response (logit) model allowing for provider-specific intercepts (Hardin & Hilbe, 2007; Hausman & Leonard, 1997; Papke & Wooldridge, 2008) . The results are provided in Table IV . In panel A, we have collapsed the dataset of all patients with non-missing values on key variables, and in panel B, we restrict the sample to secondary, non-mental health, non-community care providers. The results are quite similar to those obtained from the patient-level analysis and confirm the existence of a break, indicating a slightly declining trajectory of the cancellation rate after the removal of the tariff. Given the robustness of the finding across model specifications and levels of analysis, we interpret it as evidence of a slightly altered behaviour of providers regarding the last-minute cancellations of planned procedures. As a test to ensure that the model used here is not misspecified, we set some pre-policy counterfactual tariff removal dates (1, 3 and 6 months) before the official one in April 2010 and run a series of placebo regressions using the full model specification. Hence, we tested for any anticipation effects regarding the tariff removal, although it was not something widely discussed before the introduction of the 2010/2011 PbR system. However, the placebo regressions did not produce statistically significant evidence of a post-cancellation slope change. 11 10 A cross tabulation over the total sample indicated the existence of substantial differences regarding the length of stay among patients with various destinations of discharge. Patients who were discharged to their usual place of residence had a mean length of stay shorter than a day, while the mean length of stay of patients discharged elsewhere was approximately 19 days. More detailed results are available upon request. However, the tariff removal may have had a differentiated impact across types of patients. In accordance to the literature McIntosh et al., 2012) , our estimations have shown that patients with specific demographic characteristics are more likely to be cancelled on the last minute. Also, the cancellation probability varies by diagnosis chapter, therefore some procedures are more likely to be cancelled than others, for example, if they are minor procedures or they are attached to tariffs lower than the WA14Z (or the S22 before the financial year 2009/2010). Therefore, we estimated the full model specification (column 6, Table III ) on a series of subsamples defined by demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnic group, socio-economic status), diagnosis code and provider type. Table V reports the results for the restricted sample, that is, the one corresponding to panel B of Table III, although the results are quite similar even when the full sample of patients with non-missing values is used. The decline in the cancellation probability seems to be slightly greater for men. With respect to age, it is mostly driven by patients aged between 60 and 90 years old. The decline is also stronger for patients with an Indian ethnic background and for those living in more deprived areas. Regarding the type of provider, there is weak evidence about a structural break in the case of specialist hospitals, but in general, there is no significant differentiation across provider types.
Moreover, the reduction in the last-minute cancellation probability seems to be greater for certain types of diagnoses, namely, for infectious and parasitic diseases (ICD-I), diseases of the blood and certain disorders involving the immune mechanism (ICD-III), diseases of the ear (ICD-VIII) and symptoms and signs (ICD-XVIII). This provides some justification about last-minute cancellations of minor procedures that are attached to lower tariffs (prior to its removal, the WA14Z tariff was lying in the 28th percentile of the 2009/2010 distribution of planned same day tariffs). According to the 2009/2010 tariff information spreadsheet, there were several HRG codes attached to tariffs lower than the WA14Z one and were associated with ICD-10 diagnosis chapters for which the cancellation probability followed a downward slopping post-reform trajectory, for example, thalassaemia, pleurisy, disorders of immunity without HIV/AIDS, thrombocytopaenia, and minor and intermediate ear disorders. Ideally, we would be able to know what kind of operation would have been carried out; however, there is no way to acquire this information because all cancelled operations are coded as WA14Z rather than as the originally planned procedure . 12 Knowing this information could enable us to test the extent to which providers responded to the tariff removal on an individual basis. Also, a difference-in-differences style estimator comparing procedures with high versus low tariffs (relative to WA14Z) before and after the reform could have been used. Moreover, we do not know if the procedure was cancelled for clinical or non-clinical reasons, as the latter could be considered of greater relevance because the literature suggests that the reasons of last-minute cancellations of elective procedures are mainly non-clinical (e.g. Dexter et al., 2005; Sanjay et al., 2007) . However, given the design of the WA14Z tariff and its relative position over the tariff distribution, one can argue about the existence of an incentive to cancel a planned procedure after admission and test this hypothesis using the timing of the tariff removal.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we attempted to evaluate a recent tariff reform for cancelled elective procedures in the English NHS. Until financial year 2009/2010, providers were able to claim a fixed reimbursement of £469 for procedures that were cancelled after the patient was admitted. Given the fact that the tariff associated with last-minute cancellations was abolished in April 2010, we seek to explore whether it acted as an incentive for providers to cancel at the last minute and/or cancel low tariff procedures in favour of receiving the fixed reimbursement or higher tariff work. In order to do so, we compared their behaviour regarding last-minute cancellations before and after the tariff elimination. A main assumption we make is that if the tariff did operate as an incentive for trusts, its removal would result in a decreasing probability of a procedure being cancelled on the last minute in the post-tariff period. However, because the tariff removal was applied to all NHS providers under the 2010/2011 PbR framework, there was no way to define treated and control providers. Moreover, as there was no information on what procedure was originally planned to be carried out, a difference-in-differences style estimator could not be adopted either. Instead, as common in the healthcare literature, we followed an interrupted time series approach to examine if there was a change in the behaviour of providers regarding lastminute cancellation in the post-reform period. Based on an extract of the HES data between January of 2009 and December of 2011, we present evidence of a statistically significant decline of the last-minute cancellation probability during the post-tariff period. The results were consistent across several model specifications, subsamples and levels of analyses, indicating a slight decrease in the incidence of last-minute cancellations after controlling for patient-level and provider-level heterogeneities. Moreover, the decline was found to be more pronounced for specific groups of patients and diagnosis types. Although there is no way of knowing what operation was originally planned to be carried out or whether the reason of the cancellation was clinical or nonclinical, we interpret that finding as evidence of hospitals' response to the tariff change. The magnitude of the estimates presented here indicate that even if the incentive to cancel was not very strong, removing a problematic tariff resulted into fewer cancellations, preventing the adverse effects for a large number of patients and generated additional savings.
